Per Curiam Orders

WIP   —  ongoing  … 

Abuse of Office via Per Curiam Orders
Per curiam orders are entered by a court under a “rebuttable presumption” that they are lawful and enforceable. We Object! It is absurd for the government to attempt to enforce the commission of a crime against the citizenry! 

Is a PER CURIAM ORDER evidence of a crime? Why so?
The US Constitution [Amendments V & XIV] promises due process of law and equal protection of law for all US citizens. Courts are responsible to provide the protection of these constitutional rights.
5 USC  § 2635.101 describes the obligations of public servants — which includes judges.
The statute enumerates several crimes arising from conflict(s) of interest by the state. When the State deprives a litigant of due process and/or equal protection of LAW,  the litigant becomes the “victim” of state-sanctioned CRIME;  “conflict of interest crimes”. Supra. A judge and/or prosecutor commits such crimes acting under malfeasance or misfeasance of office and neglect of duty. Any one of these acts of misconduct are Grounds for Impeachment.  It should be unnecessary to demonstrate a “pattern and practice” of these crimes.
Entering a per curiam order appears on the surface to be a misfeasance of office to deprive a litigant of due process of law and equal protection of law by the court. The court neglects its duty to afford a litigant “full and fair the opportunity to be heard” and to present his case in a court of
law, depriving him of due process which when enforced under law, forfeits any jurisdiction which may have vested in that court; ergo, any “ruling” by that court is a nullity, void ab initio 
and “unenforceable”.

In Pennsylvania, these rights are included in Article I of the Constitution; Declaration of Rights. Among other crimes, a per curiam order denies litigant his intangible right to honest services in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.  § 1346.

A per curiam order is one vehicle through which courts commit conflict of interest crimes. A frequent abuse of per curiam orders is to Deny an appellant the “Constitutional Right of Appeal”. Pa. Const. Article V , § 9. 

What is a Per Curiam Order?
Pennsylvania Rules of Court fails to mention or define “PER CURIAM” orders. This alleged “official” instrument is not defined or mentioned in Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure, or Rules of Appellate Procedure. It follows a priori that we need to rely upon another source of information for a definition.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines “per curiam” as follows:  … By the court.   A phrase used to distinguish an opinion of the whole court from an opinion written by any one judge. Sometimes it denotes an opinion written by the Chief Justice or presiding judge, or to a brief announcement of the disposition of a case by court not accompanied by a written opinion.
Note. Black’s law has no definition for a “per curiam order”, ergo, a per curiam order is unlawful. That is not to say it is illegal, but a per curiam order is UNLAWFUL;. i.e., not legal.   

It is not unreasonable to proceed under the theory that a definition for a per curiam order is a question of first impression. We shall begin by establishing the parameters for our analysis.
The U.S. Constitution (“Const.”) is the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const., Article VI, second clause. The Const. creates a contract between the government and the governed. All law is civil, therefore, this contract is subject to the “Principles of Commercial Law”; see “The CONTRACT“, supra.
“Commercial law is contract law”.

For a contract to be enforceable, it must be executed by all principles to the contract. i.e., it must be signed by the parties. See UCC.
Per Curiam Orders are not signed, ergo, per curiam orders are unenforceable; e.g., unlawful.
A Contract between the government and the governed is generally enforced through the courts via an order of court. It follows, therefore, that enforcement of a court order requires a signature of a judge or “a person” acting in a judicial capacity. To serve in a judicial capacity means that the actor has been approved to serve under the “constitutional delegation of authority”!

In Pennsylvania, all judges are required, prior to assuming the duties of office, to take and subscribe an oath of office “to support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth” swearing or affirming to discharge the duties of that office with fidelity — under the public trust. This language creates a fiduciary responsibility of a “trustee” agent for the Common-wealth to serve the public, i.e., beneficiaries of the Public Trust.  (42 Pa.C.S. § 2522).  

Constitutions are organic law which cannot be amended via statutory laws. In plain language, a judge who acts contrary to organic law as memorialized in the U.S. Const., or the Const. of PA, and who is not discharging the duties of that office with fidelity cannot be discharging the duties of that office. That judge is exercising arbitrary and capricious conduct in violation of the duties of his/her office. That judge is “at war” with the Constitution. (Malfeasance and misfeasance of office;  neglect of duty)

Under the U.S. Const. and the Constitution of Pennsylvania, all U.S. citizens and citizens of Pennsylvania are endowed with the inalienable rights of due process and equal protection of the law. The Law is the “contract” between government and We the People. These inalienable rights include inter alia the protection against assumption of jurisdiction by agents for the government, whether judicial or law enforcement agents.

Socratic analysis reveals beyond any reasonable doubt that a “per curiam order”, in and of itself, violates the oath of office of judges and justices to discharge the duties of their office with fidelity.  Any unsigned contract is unenforceable; ergo, an unsigned order of court (un-memorialized contract) is also unenforceable.  Contrary argument is most welcome! 

A similar analysis will demonstrate clearly and beyond reasonable doubt that the act of issuing a per curiam order is “arbitrary”.
Per Black’s Law definition:  a decision arising from will or caprice, … without reason, DESPOTIC, TYRANNICAL and with capricious disregard of fact and law. i.e., arbitrary and capricious, … Without determining principle. Cites omitted.

An order of court without the signature of the presiding judge or justice is an unenforceable document under contract law. Without a signature there is No Contract.

In further expansion of Black’s Law definitions, a per curiam order pretends to be an order by the whole court, in other words, a unanimous decision. To execute or memorialize this instrument, a signature, presumptively by the Chief Justice or president judge of the court, is necessary.
Where the Chief Justice or president judge chooses to withhold his/her signature, the contract is incomplete and unenforceable. The Contract is not voidable, it is void for lack of execution by the court; a nullity.  The decision of the court is effectively No Decision. 

The matter raised now before this Supreme Court concerns an interpretation of “organic” law, subject to the limitations imposed by Article VI, second clause of the U. S. Constitution. It involves a matter where an accused was “presumed” guilty without a trial, and was DENIED his Demand for a trial. Other discrepancies by the lower court and the appellate court constitute criminal misconduct under several federal and state statutes. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania entered a “per curiam” order that implies, by unanimous finding (under Black’s Law definition) that “a lower court in this Commonwealth may assume, with absolute disregard of its fiduciary responsibility, jurisdiction of a matter that requires the moving party (Commonwealth) to establish jurisdiction after the adverse party challenges subject matter jurisdiction in that lower court.”
A court that unlawfully assumes jurisdiction commits treason against the U.S. Constitution.

Settled law holds that lack of jurisdiction constitutes a deprivation of due process of law, a constitutional right under organic law. This “right” cannot be diminished or impinged [encroached] upon by any state or local statute. Strict proof to the contrary is demanded.

When a state statute encroaches on a constitutional right, the standard of review by appellate courts is the “strict scrutiny” test; a three prong test requiring: 1) a compelling governmental / state interest to uphold the application of the subject statute, 2 ) the statute or policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest or goal, and 3) the application of the statute or policy must be the least restrictive means for achieving that compelling governmental interest.
The order appealed from is the per curiam order that DENIES appellant access to a court of law and a jury trial in a court of original jurisdiction where the lower court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and/or in personal jurisdiction. 
Appellant was DENIED his Constitutional rights to a trial by jury, due process of law and equal protection of law that prohibits criminal prosecution in Pennsylvania courts of a statute repugnant to the U.S. Constitution, to wit, 42 Pa.C.S. § 2524 – Penalty for unauthorized practice of law (UPL).
“A law repugnant to the Constitution is void. An act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution cannot become a law.” Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
“An unconstitutional act is not law. It confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office. It is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886).

“An unconstitutional law is void and is as no law. An offense created by it is not a crime. A conviction under it is not merely erroneous but is illegal and void and cannot be used as a legal cause of imprisonment.” Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
“Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or legislation which would abrogate them.” Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

A compelling argument can be presented that the “compelling state interestthroughout these proceedings is the state’s intent to cover-up the lower court conflict of interest crimes against a whistle-blower attorney.
Another “compelling state interest” may be to conceal the exposure of  criminal misconduct of one public servant by another government employee. e.g., the vigorous prosecution of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Kathleen Kane, by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania  (SCOPa). 

Subject matter jurisdiction for this matter is vested in federal courts to combat the “appearance of impropriety and susceptibility to prejudice” that arises in a state court when the state is complainant. See Uniform Bonding Code, RULE 5.0 to diffuse the “home court advantage”.
 As noted above, when Constitutional rights are at issue, this court must apply the three-pronged strict scrutiny test, supra.

Strict Scrutiny is the most stringent standard of judicial review used by United States courts that is, under the constitutional delegation of authority, disbursed to all lower courts, including state courts. An action DENIED Per Curiam by order of the appellate court and/or Supreme Court of Pennsylvania DENIES due process and equal protection under the law, satisfying mandatory review under strict scrutiny.
42 Pa.C.S. § 2524, supra, is inherently an UNCONSTITUTIONAL statute that adversely affects a property interest (a fundamental right) of an accused, as well.
From Black’s Law Dict., 6th Ed., p. 1422. Strict scrutiny test.
Under this test for determining if there has been a denial of equal protection in which case the burden is on the govern-ment to establish the necessity of the statutory classification. Poulos v. McMahan, 250 Ga. 354, 297 S.E. 2d 451, 454. Measure which is found to affect adversely a fundamental right will be subject to “strict scrutiny” test which requires state to establish that it has a compelling interest in justifying the law and that distinctions created by law are necessary to further some governmental purpose. In re Valentie, 2 Dist., 178 C.A. 3d 470, 224 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12.

By identifying per curiam orders to be a crime, it then becomes incumbent upon this site to satisfy a “burden of proof” to produce sufficient prima facie evidence that reaches the level of “probable cause” for a prosecutor to assert that issuing a per curiam order can be nothing but criminal misconduct by the court.

Federal law, 5 U.S.C. § 2635.101, establishes that judges are public servants (trustees) under the Public Trust with a fiduciary responsibility (duty) to perform the duties of their office “with fidelity” to protect the constitutional rights of We the People. Failure to keep faith with their Oath of Office and their “obligation” as public servants evidences a failure to protect and preserve the constitutional rights of We the People.

Other criminal statutes, state and federal, are violated by judges and prosecutors with every breach of trust by a public servant: criminal conspiracy arises in every case. 

Are state court judges held to the ethical standards of 5 U.S.C. § 2635.101?
The answer must be “AYE”!  

The constitutional delegation of authority for all state courts arises from the U.S. Const., Article III. Further, Article VI, second clause holds every judge accountable to the supreme Law of the Land. Strict proof to the contrary is demanded. 

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>


 It follows that state court judges have a fiduciary responsibility (legal duty) to protect and preserve the constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of law for all litigants. This creates a rebuttable presumption that knowing and willful deprivation of constitutional rights constitutes a “conflict of interest” crime by the judge.
Note: Where deprivation of rights  involves a criminal conspiracy, the “presumption” of “confllict of interest crime” cannot be overturned. 

The Pennsylvania Legislature declares … “that public office is a public trust … ”. Title 65 Pa.C.S.A. § § 1101.1 — Public Officers. This Title deals with “Ethics” for public servants. It follows a priori  that Pennsylvania’s “public officers” shall be held to the same standards as federal public officers; i.e., subject to 5 USC § 2635.101 Basic obligation of public service.